Friedrich Merz’s criticism of Donald Trump last month reflected more than a moment of personal candour or a split between Berlin and the White House. It pointed to a broader shift under way among European leaders. Increasingly they are willing to publicly confront the Trump administration on issues ranging from Iran to Ukraine and European sovereignty.
The Trump administration’s ever-more erratic policies and the belief that they necessitate a more forceful response partly explains this shift.
The German chancellor directed his remarks at the war on Iran. He did not believe, he told an event at a school in his constituency, that Trump had a viable exit strategy. Moreover, Tehran’s clever diplomacy had “humiliated” the US. But Merz’s comments do not exist in isolation – they followed a series of tough interventions from European leaders including Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer and even Giorgia Meloni.
The US’s attempt to acquire Greenland earlier this year crossed clear European red lines regarding the territorial integrity of a Nato ally and the right to self-determination of the Greenlandic people. So did attempts by Trump and his vice-president, JD Vance, to influence Hungary’s election in favour of Viktor Orbán.
Yet none of these crises alone explain Europe’s harder stance. More important is the growing and justified belief inside European capitals that Washington holds less leverage over the continent than it did a year ago.
The Iran war has demonstrated that the US needs Europe-based military infrastructure to project power in the Middle East, suggesting that military dependency is not entirely one-sided. Europe’s military spending has also risen sharply since Trump’s return to office, and a growing share is being directed towards European arms manufacturers.
The US remains Europe’s dominant arms supplier. Yet the Sipri thinktank estimates that the US share of arms transfers to Europe fell to 58% from 2021-25, down from 64% over the 2020-24 period.
The same logic now shapes European thinking on Ukraine. Since March 2025, the US has halted all financing to Kyiv, meaning the bulk of Ukraine’s funding now comes from the EU. Ukraine continues to purchase weapons through Nato’s US-inspired prioritised Ukraine requirements list but it sources a much larger share of its military needs from outside the US. About 60% of military hardware comes from Ukrainian domestic production and 20% from European suppliers.
The US still provides critical capabilities, particularly when it comes to intelligence and air defence. But European officials increasingly believe that even a significant reduction in US support in these areas would not produce an immediate Ukrainian collapse. A less US-dependent Ukraine means a less US-dependent Europe.
European governments have also come to see that many of Trump’s threats never fully materialise. Resistance to the president – from Congress, the courts and even parts of his own Maga coalition – is growing.
EU leaders are less worried, too, about the potency of the Maga movement and its influence on elections in Europe after Trump and Vance’s interventions failed so spectacularly in Hungary. Given the widespread unpopularity of Trump among the European public, standing up to the US is giving European leaders a much-needed opinion poll bounce.
This shift in mood is likely to shape Europe’s response to future disputes with the US, particularly on trade. If Washington proceeds with higher tariffs on European exports such as cars, as Trump is now threatening, the EU will respond more forcefully than it did last year, when it swallowed a 15% tariff hike as part of the US-EU Turnberry trade deal.
EU member states have already approved retaliatory measures covering €93bn of US exports, even if the European Commission would initially leave some room for negotiation. The EU will also continue to take steps to promote “de-risking” from the US in defence, digital services and other critical areas.
The Greenland risk could yet resurface. Danish, Greenlandic and US officials tasked with addressing US security concerns in the Arctic are not making much progress. If Trump’s territorial threats are renewed, the EU would most likely respond with its powerful anti-coercion instrument that would target US hi-tech service providers.
In sum, Europe’s relationship with the US is becoming less deferential. European governments believe that they have greater capacity to resist US pressure. Trump’s aura of invincibility has been dispelled in the US – but also in Europe. His allies no longer feel that they have to flatter and pander their way to the end of his second term.
