Iceland is preparing for a referendum this summer on whether to restart negotiations with the EU about joining the bloc. If voters approve, the government in Reykjavík could complete talks for the country to become the EU’s 28th member state. Iceland is already part of the Schengen passport-free area, and has access to the EU single market through the European Economic Area, meaning that much of the regulatory groundwork for its integration is already done.
Yet the conversation about a possible Icelandic application for EU membership reveals a deeper issue: the European Union must rethink its own future admission of like-minded democracies as a geopolitical necessity.
There is, thankfully, a long queue of candidate countries, from Ukraine to Montenegro, seeking to become members of the club. At some point in the future, who knows, the UK and even Canada might come knocking on our door. Either way, deep reforms within the EU are needed to cope with further expansion.
As we learned with Hungary under Viktor Orbán, a union of 27 countries, let alone 32, cannot run efficiently on unanimity, the principle that allows one country to veto decisions and progress for everyone else.
For years, Iceland’s potential membership has stumbled over fishing rights. Iceland’s economy and national identity are deeply tied to the control of its territorial waters, and disputes over the EU’s common fisheries policy were one of the main reasons why negotiations, which first began in 2009, stalled four years later.
It hardly seems appropriate that a single policy issue – fisheries, in this instance – can paralyse an entire accession process. But Iceland’s difficulty demonstrates how the EU’s traditional enlargement model, requiring full alignment by candidate countries across every policy area from day one, is increasingly ill-suited for a world in which Europe needs to expand strategically, move faster and build coalitions with like-minded democracies.
A more flexible membership process should become the rule, not the exception, while maintaining a strict merit-based approach to assessing a country’s readiness and its commitment to the rule of law as a core condition. Those who oppose letting more members join the club will use existing EU treaties to block reform, but they fail to fully appreciate the extent to which Europe already operates at different speeds.
There are different ways to be part of the EU. Not every country has adopted the euro as its currency, despite this being a condition of membership. Not every member is part of the Schengen agreement, or of defence initiatives. The concept of a “multi-speed Europe” exists already, case by case. But this logic has never been fully applied as a new enlargement model. Now it’s time to move on from our old ways.
We must remember, as we have seen all too well since the fall of the Berlin Wall, that countries neighbouring the EU can be very much up for grabs for competing powers. When it was an EU member, the UK played an active role in encouraging engagement in the Balkans. Regrettably, after Brexit that slipped, and Russia and China have filled the void. It is in our interests to have stable, democratic neighbouring countries. Hence, we must once again understand enlargement not as a threat but as a strategic instrument of power projection and continental stabilisation.
A new, more flexible system of enlargement would allow the EU to anchor candidate countries earlier at the heart of its institutions. This approach would recognise that sovereignty sharing can occur in layers: countries could take part in the single market before their full institutional integration, integrate their security and defence before complete political accession. They could opt out selectively from certain sensitive domains.
Enlargement is one of the few tools the EU possesses to shape its neighbourhood peacefully yet decisively. But the painstaking, box-ticking logic that defined previous enlargements prioritised completeness over speed. Today, time lost risks giving the upper hand to China, Russia or even the Trump family. Ultimately, it would also foster public disillusionment with Europe, democratic backsliding and regional instability, as we have seen in Serbia.
Admitting Iceland would strengthen Europe’s Arctic strategy and our defensive capabilities in the North Atlantic, amid reports of increased Russian and Chinese activity in the region. For the people of Iceland, accession would mean security and safety as a member of a club of democracies.
At the same time, Reykjavík would lend the EU deep expertise in ocean governance, climate science and Arctic diplomacy.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threats of Donald Trump and China, Europe’s security architecture has to evolve. If the EU is serious about becoming a geopolitical actor, it will eventually need more agile decision-making structures – including a possible European Security Council bringing together key states for rapid coordination on foreign and defence policy.
Iceland, a Nato member located at a critical North Atlantic crossroads, would be a natural participant in such a framework. Its geography alone – between North America, Greenland and Europe – makes it strategically indispensable. Getting Iceland on board would kick off the geopolitical rise of an EU that understands the realities of the 21st century.