US couldn’t repair battle-damaged ships in war with China, study finds

Battle-damaged U.S. warships could not be quickly repaired and returned to combat during a war with China, according to a new report.

U.S. maintenance facilities would be overwhelmed and would lack sufficient spare parts to repair ships in theater, concluded the study by RAND, a Washington-based think tank. Nor can the U.S. Navy assume that its Pacific allies have adequate shipyard capacity — or political willingness — to fix damaged vessels.

The U.S. Navy has struggled with overworked ships and crews, as well as overburdened shipyards and repair depots. But a war with China, which has the world’s largest navy, would almost certainly result in American ships being hit by everything from ballistic “carrier-killer” missiles, to hypersonic weapons and torpedoes, the study says.

“The Navy has not faced damage at the level likely to occur in a major war since World War II,” warned RAND.

The study recommended that command-and-control authority for repair work be streamlined, including prior agreements with allied nations regarding access to facilities. It also urged the U.S. Navy to expand its mobile repair capabilities, including “deployable repair teams, flyaway assessment units, and scalable Expeditionary Mobile Repair Facilities.”

Barriers to repairs

RAND’s analysis was based on a tabletop wargame conducted in August 2025. The setting was a hypothetical war with China, as U.S. ships race to defend Taiwan from invasion or blockade. The American vessels in question were Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the backbone of the U.S. surface fleet.

The U.S. Navy will need every ship it can get, including damaged vessels patched up and rejoining the fight. However, “existing Navy systems for battle-damage repair are burdened by a variety of inefficiencies that hinder the Navy’s capacity for responding to widespread battle damage,” the study warned.

Analysts also found that “attempting repairs in a hostile Indo-Pacific environment will be significantly more complex than existing plans allow. This complexity creates serious risks to U.S. and allied rapid force regeneration and maritime dominance.”

Meanwhile, Chinese ships would be operating close to their home bases and repair facilities.

“China is not only closer, it also has significantly better industrial repair capability,” Bradley Martin, a RAND analyst who co-authored the report, told Defense News.

Though the game focused on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, repair issues would “apply to all ship classes, and in fact may be more pronounced where nuclear repairs are involved. Issues of access, vulnerability, and industrial capacity apply across all ship classes.”

Rather than combat, the game focused on how damaged ships could be repaired in the Pacific theater and returned to combat, rather than spending weeks limping back to U.S. ports. This would likely require U.S. access to ports and shipyards in allied nations.

During the game, teams represented the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, Korea and Australia.

The four scenarios spanned a variety of situations. They included a U.S. destroyer colliding with a Chinese frigate in the Straits of Malacca, two destroyers damaged by gunfire and rockets from Chinese ships and helicopters while escorting Philippines ships in disputed waters in the South China Sea, several destroyers severely damaged by Chinese anti-ship missiles while defending the Philippines, and multiple destroyers badly damaged while intercepting a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

Poor coordination with allies

The common denominator was that all of the American ships needed quick repairs. But that was easier said than done.

For starters, there were difficulties determining what resources were needed for repairs, and whether a vessel could be fixed locally or would have to sail back to the United States.

Players also “assumed that regulations and standards for repair and maintenance would remain the same in a wartime environment as they are during peacetime,” the report said.

Nor were command arrangements clear. For example, “the group that represented the in-theater logistics and maintenance team at times took actions, specifically those related to in-theater repair options, that the theater operational commander had already rejected because of operational constraints,” said the report.

In addition, coordination was lacking between organizations in the Pacific and the U.S. The U.S. team didn’t fully understand what its Pacific allies could offer.

“U.S. participants demonstrated knowledge gaps about the locations of host nations’ ports, not to mention host nations’ capabilities or access requirements,” the study noted. Though Japan, Korea and Australia have significant resources, “some kinds of operations — such as ordnance handling or a lengthy repair — would bring complications.“

Allied nations were also mindful that repairing U.S. warships could bring Chinese retaliation.

“Japan, the ROK [Republic of Korea], and Australia are in principle committed to supporting U.S. repair, but this cannot be assumed once the threat level starts to escalate,” said Martin.

However, the study did note that “although there were significant knowledge gaps at the outset of the exercise, once ally members explained their capabilities, collaboration was mostly seamless.”

Sufficient spare parts were also an issue, especially for older ships.

“Even ships within the same class can be significantly different from one another,” the study noted. “Some critical parts or systems from one ship might not translate to another ship.”