Spain’s Civil Guard has produced a six-page report examining the possibility of another mass migrant crossing into the Spanish territory of Ceuta on 15 August.
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The document, obtained by Spanish media outlet Mañaneros, is based on a campaign circulating on social media that, according to the report, has reached groups with hundreds of thousands of followers.
The analysis relies entirely on open-source information – social media posts and media reports – and was intended to determine whether the online call to make the crossing was genuine, how widely it had spread, and the degree of coordination behind it.
The report stops short of drawing firm conclusions, however. As cited by RTVE, it said there was no basis for estimating how many people might take part or for assuming that the events seen in late July would be repeated on 15 August.
Its conclusion is that an active online campaign exists with the potential to mobilise people, but whether it will actually result in a mass crossing, how many people would be involved, and who is behind it all remain unknown. The report added that much will depend on Morocco’s preventive measures on roads, at transport hubs, in the town of Fnideq, and along the coast, as well as on Spain’s security operation.
What prompted the investigation?
According to the Civil Guard, the messages first began circulating in late July and early August, when young Moroccans started sharing calls for another collective attempt to reach the North African territory of Ceuta around 15 August.
The report compares coverage from both Spanish and Moroccan media, noting that the issue is no longer confined to Spanish social media. Investigators also examined Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram groups with memberships ranging from around 400,000 to just over 422,000 people, although the report itself cautioned against reading too much into those figures.
Investigators say the most significant factor is not the size of those groups but the recurring patterns they identified: repeated references to 15 August, the same geographical locations, discussions about how to organise the crossing, and the persistence of these messages over several days. Monitoring continued until 4 August.
The report also found a significant amount of misinformation circulating online, including claims that the border would be opened, that migrants would receive asylum or financial assistance, or that anyone reaching Ceuta could not legally be returned.
Who is behind the drive?
The report describes the online campaign as decentralised. Rather than identifying a single organiser, investigators found that the proposed date appeared to spread organically from one online group to another.
Based on the open-source material reviewed, the Civil Guard said it had been unable to identify those responsible for promoting the campaign. It also said it had found no evidence linking it to the Moroccan government, Moroccan security services, or any specific migrant-smuggling network.
But the report dismissed the idea that the campaign was spontaneous. It concluded that there appears to be “some degree of digital facilitation”- in other words, some level of coordination behind the online activity – even though its source and extent remain unclear.
Brussels keeps watch
The European Commission said it was closely monitoring social media ahead of 15 August.
“We remain fully vigilant before, during, and after 15 August,” Commission spokesperson Guillaume Mercier said.
However, Brussels urged caution, stressing that many of the reports circulating online “have not been verified” and that the overall picture remains “unclear.” The Commission said it was staying in close contact with both the Spanish and Moroccan authorities.
It also said it had detected Russian-linked channels that began rapidly amplifying the migration issue from 30 July onwards.
The Commission noted that the European Union can use legislation such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) to tackle online disinformation. The law requires major digital platforms and search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks to public security. Spain has not, however, activated the DSA’s crisis mechanism, which would allow for enhanced coordination with the platforms.