The Andhra Pradesh government’s reported decision to offer ₹30,000 for a third child and ₹40,000 for a fourth child, along with a monthly provision of ₹1,000 per month for up to five years, marks a striking reversal in India’s programmes for population control. For decades, States were told to reduce fertility. Today, some of the very States that succeeded in doing so are worried about having too few children. Andhra Pradesh’s concern is not misplaced. Its fertility rate of 1.5 has fallen below the replacement level, and the State is beginning to look at a future of fewer children, fewer young workers and more elderly citizens.
The population in India is never merely a health statistic. It shapes parliamentary representation, delimitation debates, fiscal claims, labour supply, market size and the political capital of a State.
Counting children
The total fertility rate, or TFR, is the average number of children a woman is expected to have during her reproductive years if current birth patterns continue. A TFR of about 2.1 is considered the replacement level. In simple language, two children are needed to replace two parents. The extra 0.1 accounts for child mortality and the fact that the number of boys and girls born is not exactly equal. When fertility remains below 2.1 for many years, a population may first age and later shrink. This does not happen overnight. A State with many young people may continue to grow for some years even after fertility falls below replacement level. This is called population momentum. But after a few decades, the consequences become visible. There are fewer schoolchildren, fewer entrants into the workforce, more elderly citizens and greater pressure on families, hospitals and welfare systems.
The demographic turn
This change is part of a larger demographic transition. In older societies, both birth rates and death rates were high. Families had many children because child survival was uncertain, and children contributed to household work. With vaccination, sanitation, antibiotics, nutrition and safer childbirth, death rates fell. For some time, births remained high while deaths declined, causing rapid population growth. Later, with education, urbanisation, women’s employment and rising child-rearing costs, birth rates also fell. Many societies moved from high birth and death rates to lower ones. The difficulty begins when fertility falls below replacement level and remains there.
Korea’s warning
South Korea is the most dramatic of warnings globally. In the 1960s, there was concern about excess population. Within a few generations, it moved from fear of too many children to fear of too few. Its fertility rate has fallen to 0.7, one of the lowest levels ever recorded worldwide. Yet this did not happen because the government ignored the problem. South Korea spent heavily on cash transfers, childcare subsidies, tax benefits, parental leave, housing-related support and incentives for marriage and childbirth. The results remained weak because young Koreans were not avoiding children merely because childbirth expenses were high. They were responding to a whole-life situation. Housing was expensive, jobs were competitive, education was intense and private tutoring costs were high. Marriage was delayed. Women were expected to work like modern professionals but to be mothers like traditional homemakers. For many women, motherhood meant career damage. For many men, marriage and housing felt financially out of reach. The incentives, essentially, were not enoughl compared with what was perceived as a lifetime burden of parenting.
Japan’s decline
Japan entered the low-fertility crisis earlier than most Asian countries and is now a textbook example of an ageing society with a TFR of 1.1. Japan tried child allowances, expanded childcare, parental leave, support for fertility treatment, and work-life balance measures. The “Angel Plan” and later programmes attempted to make parenting easier. Yet Japan did not return to replacement fertility. The reasons again lay outside the maternity ward. Long working hours, job insecurity among younger people, late marriages, expensive urban lives, small housing, and persistent gender expectations weakened the policy’s impact. Even when childcare facilities improved, women continued to carry much of the care burden. Japan shows that once low fertility becomes socially normal, policy has to work much harder. It must rebuild confidence in family life, not merely pay for childbirth.
Germany’s lesson
Germany gives a more moderate example with a TFR of 1.3. It has not solved low fertility, but its approach is more instructive because it moved beyond symbolic payments. For years, German women often had to choose between motherhood and full-time work. Later, Germany introduced an income-related parental allowance, expanded childcare and encouraged fathers to take parental leave. This made parenting less of a purely private burden and signalled that child-rearing required public support and gender sharing. Germany’s experience shows that policy can soften fertility decline when it supports the whole parenting ecosystem: income, leave, childcare and father involvement. But it also shows the limits of policy. Even better family support cannot fully overcome housing pressures, delayed family formation, economic uncertainty and changing aspirations. A State can make parenting easier; it cannot command people back into larger families.
Why incentives fail
The common lesson from South Korea, Japan and Germany is clear. Cash helps, but cash alone does not transform fertility behaviour. A family does not decide on a second or third child based solely on the money received at delivery. It considers school fees, house rent, medical costs, job security, commute time, elderly parents, maternity penalties, childcare, safety, and future aspirations. The State may pay a visible one-time incentive, but the family carries a large invisible liability. This is why fertility decline must not be treated as a disease. It is often a rational response to modern life. When children become economically expensive, emotionally demanding and professionally disruptive, families reduce family size. One-time incentives may help families already inclined to have another child. They may ease immediate childbirth expenses. But they rarely change the deeper family-size norm of an entire generation. A serious policy must strengthen anganwadis, affordable crèches, public schools, paediatric care, nutrition support, safe transport and working-mother support. It must include paternity leave and encourage fathers to share care work. It must protect women’s education, employment, health and autonomy.
Beyond childbirth
Andhra Pradesh has correctly identified a real demographic issue. But if fertility decline is treated only as a problem of insufficient financial motivation, the response will remain narrow. South Korea shows that large spending can fail when housing, education costs and gender inequality remain unresolved. Japan shows that late correction is difficult once low fertility becomes socially normal. Germany shows that policy works better when it supports parents across the life course. The real question is whether the State can create a society in which young couples feel that raising children will not severely impact their finances, careers, health, or aspirations and where support, affordable care structures, flexibility and gender equity are the norm.
(Dr. C. Aravinda is an academic and public health physician. The views expressed are personal. aravindaaiimsjr10@hotmail.com)
Published – June 07, 2026 08:00 pm IST